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Over the last few years, Universal health coverage (UHC) has become a central objective of the 
international agenda for social protection, development and health. Described by M. Chan, 
former Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), as “the most powerful 
concept that public health has to offer”2, the objective of UHC has been adopted by several 
assemblies (World health assembly, 2005; United Nations General Assembly, 2012) and raised 
as a target of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 3:8).  
UHC is commonly defined as ensuring that “all people obtain the health services they need 
without suffering financial hardship when paying for them”3.Comparing it to the “refrain of 
Health for All”, O’Connell, Rasanathan, & Chopra (2014) have highlighted that the 
“imprecision of these three terms hinders discussions around key policy questions”. Nauleau, 
Destremau, & Lautier  considered UHC as a « frame of objective » (référentiel d’objectif) 4 of 
public policy, “that aims to establish new configurations of actors and objectives, at the global 
scale, according to an ethical and weakly normative consensus” (2013 : 145) .Similarly, Kutzin 
pointed out that “unless the concept is clearly understood, [it] can be used to justify practically 
any health financing reform or scheme” (Kutzin, 2013 : 602). 
Indeed, the path to achieve UHC is little marked out. Moving towards UHC implies to reduce 
out-of-pocket payments, by promoting prepayment and pooling mechanisms. However, there 
is no “one-size-fits-all approach to achieving UHC” (World Bank & World Health 
Organization, n.d.). WHO suggests that “all countries must make choices and trade-offs”, 
adding that “simply adopting elements from a menu of options, or importing what has been 
shown to work in other settings, will not be sufficient. Health financing strategy needs to be 
home-grown” (World Health Organization, 2010 : 12-90).  
This broad definition of the objective of UHC, combined with the shared conception that social 
protection is a national matter as well as the absence of “one-size-fits-all approach”, provides 
                                                          
1 The research was funded through the ARC grant for Concerted Research Actions, financed by the Wallonia-
Brussels Federation 
2 http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/universal-health-coverage/en/  
3 http://www.who.int/features/qa/universal_health_coverage/en/  
4 This concept comes from the cognitive approach of public policy developed by Jobert & Muller (1987). 
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national governments with room of manoeuvre to design their national policies. This contrasts 
with the “travelling models” that abound in Global Health (Olivier de Sardan, Diarra, & Moha, 
2017) and it leads to different strategies being adopted and implemented from one country to 
another.  
However, UHC is a highly political matter and involves different national and international 
stakeholders with competing interests and ideas. Many factors influence the formulation 
process and adoption of strategies to achieve UHC. This contribution aims to provide a 
comparative analysis of the formulation process and design of UHC policies in Benin and 
Senegal, and attempts to answer several questions: How is the concept of UHC understood and 
translated in the national arena of two West-African countries that have quite similar health 
history and challenges? What are the commonalities and differences between the Beninese and 
Senegalese strategies to achieve UHC? How can the ‘3I’ (institutions, interests and ideas) of 
public policies analysis shed light on these processes and choices?     
This research is based on a revue of the literature and several socio-anthropological field 
missions in Benin and Senegal undertaken between 2014 and 2018. We conducted key 
stakeholders’ interviews in both countries. The recorded interviews were fully transcribed and 
are being coded with Nvivo 105. The verbatim used in this paper are translated from French to 
English.  
Our theoretical approach is inspired by different references that imply going beyond 
“monocausal models” in the analysis of public policy and policy change (Béland, 2010a). Palier 
and Surel (2005) suggest that the “3I” (institutions, interests and ideas) should be taken into 
account in a complementary manner and that an inductive approach should allow us to rank the 
influence of these three dimensions ex post. Fox and Reich (2015) developed a theory-based 
framework organized around four policy cycle stages and four variables (interests, institutions, 
ideas and ideology) that can guide us in the study of UHC reforms. Finally, Shearer, Abelson, 
Kouyaté, Lavis, & Walt (2016) reconciled policy network analysis with institutions, interests, 
and ideas.  
In the first section, we briefly introduce the Beninese and Senegalese current reforms to achieve 
UHC, so as to set the context. We then successively propose an analysis of the influence of 
institutions, ideas and interests on both reforms or some of their distinctive features.  
Same objective, different paths: an overview of UHC strategies in Benin and Senegal 
 
The objective of UHC has first been set at the national agendas of both countries around 2007 
and 2008. Despite having quite similar histories in terms of social security and health financing 
reforms, Senegal and Benin chose different paths on their way to achieve UHC.  
In Senegal, the objective of UHC was first translated into the “expansion of Senegalese health 
risk coverage national strategy” under Wade’s Presidency, but most of the strategies formulated 
in this plan were materialized after the election of President Macky Sall in 2012. The UHC 
                                                          
5 Work in progress 
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programme, called Couverture Maladie Universelle, was launched in 2013 around three main 
lines: (1) reforming the health planning institutions (Institutions de Prévoyance Maladie, IPM) 
that cover workers in the private sector; (2) reforming and expanding user fees exemption 
policies, with a new policy aimed at children under 5 years old; (3) expanding health coverage 
through community-based insurance (CBHI) schemes in the context of decentralization 
(Décentralisation de l’Assurance Maladie, DECAM project).  
Based on the catchline “One local authority, one community-based health insurance scheme”, 
CHBI schemes were created and restructured all around the country. The contributions of their 
members are either half subsidized by the state (50% from 7.000 FCFA) or fully subsidized (for 
people identified as vulnerable or extremely poor). The members of CBHI schemes are entitled 
to a “basic package” managed by local CBHI as well as a complementary package managed by 
CBHI unions at the department level. However, new initiatives aimed at expanding coverage 
were launched in 2018, such as CMU for pupils, that covers a downsized package in exchange 
for a contribution of 1.000 FCFA per year.  
According to the CMU-Agency’s repot (2017), at the end of 2016, the coverage rate was 
estimated at 46.8% of the population, all schemes combined. 671 CHBI schemes were officially 
recognized, covering 16% of the population. However, nearly two third of members enrolled in 
CBHI schemes were fully subsidized by the state, which highlights the persistent challenge to 
enrol the population and convince them to pay for health insurance without mandatory 
contribution.  
In Benin, process of thought on UHC began in 2008 and lead to the official launch of a 
programme called Universal Health Insurance Scheme (Régime d’Assurance Maladie 
Universelle, RAMU) in 2011. This programme was intended to cover the whole population 
through a national agency (Agence Nationale de l’Assurance Maladie, ANAM) that was 
established in 2012. However, RAMU was never really implemented, and its failure is 
commonly attributed to its politicization, that got the upper hand on the technical aspects. In 
December 2015, the national assembly still adopted a law establishing RAMU as a compulsory 
scheme that would gradually cover all Beninese.  
Following the election in march 2016, the newly elected President Patrice Talon announced his 
decision to revoke RAMU, in order to implement a new project called Insurance for the 
strengthening of human capital (Assurance pour le Renforcement du Capital Humain, ARCH). 
It aims to develop social protection for the informal workers and vulnerable populations around 
four branches: health insurance, retirement planning, microcredit and occupational training. 
Health insurance is the key component in this project, as it would be mandatory, would replace 
exemption policies, and would also imply a reform of social security schemes for civil servant 
and private sector workers. The project intends to exempt extremely poor people from 
contribution, as well as to partly subsidy the rest of the population living below the poverty line.  
A National Agency for Social Protection (ANPS) would be in charge of the implementation of 
ARCH project, but, in accordance with the President’s will to stimulate public-private 
partnerships, its management would most probably be delegated to an insurance company. 
However, in 2018, the ARCH project is still at the formulation stage, as the implementation has 
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been postponed several times. The steering committee created for the project has been turned 
into a technical unit that works in close collaboration with the President. The information 
disseminated about the project is scarce and the coalitions needed to make this project happen 
seem more and more uncertain.  
Fragmented reforms, path dependency and the role of institutions 
 
In Benin and Senegal, the social security schemes aimed at public servants and the workers in 
the private sector have been inherited from the colonial period and were institutionalized after 
independence with the idea that coverage would expand alongside formalized employment. 
However, this transition never happened, and formalized employment even tended to decrease 
subsequent to structural adjustment programs. Hence, institutionalized social security schemes 
only covers a minority of relatively privileged people, while the majority of the population has 
to rely on interpersonal solidarity or scattered initiatives such as community-based health 
insurance to deal with out-of-pockets payments (Baumann, 2010). Evidence also points to the 
fact that some people have to borrow money or sell assets to be able to pay for health services 
(Kruk, Goldmann, & Galea, 2009), when they do not simply give up on care.  
UHC reforms are primarily aimed at expanding coverage to the population excluded from social 
security schemes (Alenda, s. d.), with a focus on equity of access for the poorest of them.  New 
schemes are especially designed to cover workers from the informal sector as well as 
“indigents” and are added to the pre-existing social security institutions. In Senegal, this is the 
case with the DECAM project that aims to cover the “informal and rural sectors” through CBHI 
schemes, in parallel with IPM’s reform and the preservation of separated schemes for public 
servants and retired people. In Benin, the ARCH project is also primarily aimed at informal 
workers and destitute people, while the state and private companies would subscribe to an 
insurance company for their workers and assignees. Cross-subsidisation between schemes is 
planned as a tax on private insurance that would directly finance the ARCH project. 
These reforms lead to a fragmented health financing landscape that rests (among others) on the 
distinction between formal and informal employment. The emphasis on expanding coverage, 
strengthened by political pressure to achieve what has been promised, also leads to more and 
more fragmentation and sedimentation (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014), as new 
initiatives or schemes are created, such as the CMU for pupils in Senegal. This fragmentation 
contrasts with international recommendations. The 2010 WHO report, for example, states that 
“multiple pools, each with their own administrations and information systems, are also 
inefficient and make it difficult to achieve equity. Usually, one of the pools will provide high 
benefits to relatively wealthy people, who will not want to cross-subsidize the costs of poorer, 
less healthy people” (WHO, 2010 : xv).  
These fragmented reforms can be understood through the study of institutions and, more 
specifically, through the phenomenon of path dependency that means that “past policies also 
set up institutions that can place countries on a certain path, which is subsequently difficult to 
change” (Fox & Reich, 2015 : 1023). As this CMU-agent describes it: 
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It could be the best option, to have one unique fund that manages health insurance. But 
Senegal has the distinctive feature to be one of the rare countries to have implemented 
a health insurance system since 1975. […] We had IPM and we had to supplement the 
system with what is missing. That’s the difference. So people have thought, CBHI 
schemes already existed in Senegal, but it was not really developed. And we considered 
that, for the excluded ones from the formal system, CBHI could be a good model, don’t 
they? A good lever to cover them. That’s it6. 
However, this institutional analysis also needs to take into account interests, as institutions 
shape them, and “radical change is rare largely because of the vested interests that policies 
create over time” (Béland, 2010b : 105). In Senegal, for example, some authors noticed that 
“trade unions represented in the bipartite social institutions for the formal sector in Senegal 
determined the scope of the reform by vetoing fundamental changes that would affect their own 
position” (Fonteneau, Vaes, & Van Ongevalle, 2017 : 25). During the negotiations of the 
national health financing strategy in 2017, one task force was about “resource pooling” and de-
fragmentation. According to one CMU-agent: 
These are difficult questions because it affects interests. […] One very complicated 
question in this group was the management unit of the different schemes. Some people 
insisted so that the creation of a unified institution to be at very long-term. We decided 
to be pragmatic7.  
The decision, as written in the Plan, was to adopt a “progressive process” with the creation of 
two different units for the formal and informal sectors (Ministère de la Santé et de l’Action 
Sociale, 2017). As Fox and Reich affirm, “incrementalism is often a by-product of veto-ridden 
systems” (2015 : 1039). The same kind of resistances have been encountered in Benin:  
Maybe it will progress towards one universal basic scheme, but people have benefits 
they are not ready to lose. There are possibilities of extraordinary resistances, and a 
risk that ARCH would never start. […] Even between us, we had virulent debates8. 
The existence of social security institutions have lock-in effects because they shape decision-
makers’ “perception on what is possible to achieve” (Fox & Reich, 2015) and restrain their 
room of manoeuvre. This leads to UHC policies described by Fonteneau et al. as “a rather 
minimalist interpretation of universalism and redistribution”, with “a strong emphasis on 
expanding coverage” (Fonteneau et al., 2017 : 23). These results are not new nor specific to the 
cases of Benin and Senegal. Soors, De Man, Ndiaye, and Criel noticed that “where efforts are 
made towards harmonisation, this happens to be an extremely difficult task, which is essentially 
political as it is conditional on bringing in line a range of actors with different interests and 
power stakes. […] Evidence suggests that to make progress towards UHC more successful by 
harmonising and eventually unifying risk pools, technical support has to be complemented by 
political support and capacity building” (2015: 14-15). However, this would require going 
beyond “the anti-political machine” (Ferguson, 1990). 
                                                          
6 Interview with CMU Agent, Sénégal, 29/03/2016.  
7 Interview with CMU Agent, Sénégal, 11/09/2017. 




The role of ideas on the institutional architecture of UHC reforms 
 
Benin and Senegal have made completely different choices regarding the institutional 
architecture of their UHC reforms. On the one hand, Senegal has opted for a voluntary 
decentralized coverage that rests upon community-based health insurance schemes as well as 
user fees exemptions. On the other hand, the Beninese successive authorities opted for 
compulsory health coverage, based on centralized schemes. The cognitive approach of public 
policy is probably the most relevant approach here, as ideas have played a major role in the 
decision for one or another path. According to (Fox & Reich, 2015 : 1034), “the design of health 
reform is influenced by the policy ideas that are present at a given historical moment and the 
actors (often behind the scenes) that are actively promoting those models”. However, this does 
not preclude any influence of interests or institutions.  
The influence of ideas, combined with the analysis of actors’ networks (Shearer et al., 2016), 
is especially perceptible in the choice of CBHI schemes as the main instrument to expand 
coverage in Senegal. Indeed, a coalition of national and international actors emerged around 
CBHI schemes, alongside the multiplication of projects and the creation of a national expertise 
on this field. CBHI schemes were progressively structured and their leaders and national and 
international partners advocated in favour of the “DECAM” model: 
We built CBHI networks in the different regions, and we understood that we also had to 
meet and exchange in order to speak as one voice. […] Secondly, we built alliances with 
technical and financial partners really soon. […] Then, we had to elaborate proposals 
in the sense of expanding health coverage. First, the CBHI development plan. Then, the 
national strategy for the expansion of health coverage. […] We were in a process of 
negotiation, influence and induction towards the ministry of Health. […] During the 
2012 presidential elections, we also had to influence the candidates. One of them said: 
‘If you elect me, I’ll accomplish universal health coverage’. At the end of the process, 
he got elected. […] The inter-ministerial council approved our proposal.9 
This coalition of actors also benefited from the skills and status of Senegalese experts of CBHI 
working for Abt Associates, an executive agency of the American health programme, who 
formulated and promoted the DECAM project and acted as “policy entrepreneurs” (Fox & 
Reich, 2015 : 1027): 
The national strategy for health coverage expansion was nearly a work from USAID 
through Abt, which is the executive agency. This work has been conducted with all 
stakeholders.10  
The elaboration and management of all this [DECAM] project, it was his work. He was 
the project team leader. He was the mastermind.11  
                                                          
9 Senegalese CBHI representative at the international conference organized by the International Association of 
Mutual Benefit Societies (AIM), Abidjan, March 2-4 2016. 
10 Interview with CMU-Agent, Sénégal, 02/03/2016 
11 Interview with Abt Associate representative, Sénégal, 29/11/2017. 
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In several national strategic documents, CBHI schemes are described as the most “pertinent” 
instrument, therefore “matching solution to the specific problem” (Fox & Reich, 2015) of the 
expansion of health insurance coverage to the rural and informal workers in Senegal. The 
proponents of CBHI schemes also regularly use the example of Fandène as evidence, as this 
scheme was the first one to be implemented in Senegal and still operates (Gollock, Haddad, & 
Fournier, 2015).  
This coalition of actors in favour of CBHI schemes also stands out in the conflict that opposed 
them to the proponents of the Belgian-Senegalese pilot project that developed professionalized 
insurance schemes, called UDAM (Unité départementale d’assurance maladie), in two 
Senegalese departments. This alternative model of CBHI schemes, that is also owned by the 
community but whose management is delegated to a professional team, has been the subject of 
multiple conflicts among partners (Abt Associates and the Belgian Development Agency) and 
within the CMU-Agency. Besides interests and interpersonal disputes, this conflict seems to 
strengthen the ideational analysis, as one contentious feature relates to community-management 
of the scheme: 
A delegated management, in which there were no more community participation… 
Against that, we must defend ourselves, we will not agree because… I mean, that’s 
something else than a CBHI !12 
At the end of the UDAM pilot-project, no consensus had been found between both models and 
future prospects were uncertain. However, the coalition of actors in favour of CBHI schemes 
has declined over the last couple years, due to mixed results in terms of voluntary subscription 
at the operational level, but also after the unfortunate death of three of leaders of this coalition 
and, alongside, senior position staff transfers. As a result, the “UDAM” design, as well as socio-
professional health insurance schemes, seem to be better considered as alternative models to 
boost the coverage rate, whereas CBHI schemes try to preserve their status. 
In Benin, the coalition around CBHI schemes is weaker and less structured. Moreover, the 
formulation process and design of successive reforms (RAMU and ARCH) has been under the 
supervision and significant influence of the President and technocrats. The influence of 
President Talon’s ideas is particularly prominent in the ARCH project, that has been described 
as “his societal project. It was already his idea as a presidential candidate. He deeply though 
about social protection”13.  
The project is developed by a management unit composed of technocrats, which matches the 
idea of “a team of well-inspired and skilled leaders” emphasized by the President (Presidence 
de la République du Bénin, 2016: 20). Similarly, the President’s will to develop public-private 
partnerships (PPP) results in the plan to delegate the management of the new social protection 
Agency to the private sector, probably through an insurance company. His societal project also 
implies to “strengthen human capital” in a productive way, far from state handouts: 
                                                          
12 Interview with CBHI leader, Senegal, 07/04/2016. 
13 Interview with project management team members, Benin, 15/03/2018. 
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Billions have been injected to fight poverty and, paradoxically, poverty has increased. 
When we analysed this situation, we noticed a lack of synergy between actions. […] And 
so, in his proposal, in his societal project, he [the President] had planned to implement 
social protection for the poorest, that would include a significant package of services, 
that would be administered to each poor person so that we would be assure that he 
would get out of his poor situation. So that there would be no more wasted micro-credit, 
or a caesarean section program, and then we don’t know who is benefitting from it, is 
it the poorest or the richest? And so, from this point forward, he wants to make sure that 
those who would be targeted as poor could exactly benefit from this assistance, and 
then, we will be able keep a close eye on them.14 
The President’s idea of good governance and strong reforms is also reflected in the will to 
implement mandatory health insurance:  
Due to the mandatory feature of health insurance, people will have no choice. We are 
currently planning a bunch of mechanisms to compel them15.  
This contrast with the perspectives of Senegal, where mandatory insurance is much debated. 
This CMU-Agent, for example, considers that: 
It is useless to say that it is mandatory if we are not able to implement it. […] If you say 
that it is mandatory, there will be countless suspicions. […] People already think that 
they pay too many taxes and that the State doesn’t contribute for them. We will be called 
a dictatorial regime16. 
According to the management team members in Benin, the repeated postponements of the 
ARCH project are partly explained by the will of the President to launch a highly-developed 
project whose technical preparation would contrast with the haste and politicisation of RAMU. 
However, the project has also been delayed by the lack of agreement with key actors such as 
insurance companies and the technical and financial partners, from which 90% of the financing 
is expected. This leads us to the analysis of “interests”. 
Interest and strategic advocacy around UHC reforms 
 
Interests have already been analysed through their embedding to institutions and ideas. As 
mentioned before, institutions shape interests, and interests can match values and ideas. 
However, the analysis of interest per se, through the action of strategic groups, is instructive as 
well. According to Fox and Reich, “decisions regarding how to finance a health system may be 
particularly contentious due to the redistributive quality of these decisions” (2015 : 1034). 
Besides, UHC policies mobilize a lot of resources that can be fought for. Conflicts have been 
encountered in both countries regarding the supervision of UHC policies, for which different 
ministry or agencies competed: 
At first, there were frictions. We even thought that UHC would leave the ministry of 
Health to be lodged in the Delegation [of Social Protection and National Solidarity]. 
There were lots of fights. Why was it such a sensitive subject? Because the Delegation 
                                                          
14 Interview with project management team member, Benin, 31/03/2017. 
15 Interview with project management team member, Benin, 31/03/2017. 
16 Interview with CMU-Agent, Senegal, 11/09/2017. 
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was managed by Macky Sall’s son-in-law. […] The CMU-Agency became a big ‘room’ 
inside the ministry of health ‘house’ and it caused conflicts. […] The agency got a ‘gold 
mine’, and some people thing that they are losing some of their prerogatives17. 
In Benin, while RAMU was supervised by an agency lodged at the ministry of Health, the 
ARCH project has been moved to the ministry of social action: 
This is the best arrangement. The ministry of health is supposed to sell health services, 
and cannot be the purchaser and the seller at the same time. So, it must be accepted that 
another institution be the purchaser18. 
However, various informants are concerned about this relegation of the ministry of health, 
alongside significant internal governance reforms, as it seems to generate major frustrations 
and could lead to the boycotting of the ARCH project at the implementation stage.  
Other stakeholders advocate to gain or maintain their position depending on their interests. As 
mentioned before, CBHI schemes and their partners have been lobbying in Senegal so as to be 
the main actor in UHC reforms. While an ideational analysis puts forwards shared values and 
visions underpinning this coalition of actors, this can also be analysed as protecting their 
interests, as they obtain many resources and power positions from this situation. They are 
currently advocating so that the UHC bill explicitly mentions CBHI schemes, as these have 
been removed in the latest draft in favour of a more generic term. In Benin, CBHI schemes also 
closely follow the progress of the ARCH project, in order to position themselves at the 
operational level.  
As the ARCH project plans to remove of exemption policies, some resistances have also 
appeared from the actors in charge of their supervision and implementation:  
We can’t develop health insurance and, at the same time, implement exemption schemes. 
When the inventory of existing mechanisms has begun, there was a wave a panic. It is 
sure that a lot of institution will disappear. Some pressure has been put on us, that’s 
clear, but we have no choice. This is a question of political will19.  
These institutions seem to have less power and influence than social security’s ones, as they 
fail to impose their interests, thereby proving that “path dependency” can be overcome under 
certain circumstances. 
The example of insurance companies in Benin is interesting as well, as they had withdrawn 
from the negotiation and formulation process of the RAMU, as they considered it to be 
politicized and could not see any interest for them in this process: 
The only problem, unfortunately, is that, at the governance level, there is a problem. It 
has been politicized too much. Even the choice of the men [leaders], the choice of the 
governance structure of RAMU, it is a mistake. We don’t need public servants; we need 
to call for applications. […] It should be private. And that’s what we told them. We said, 
                                                          
17 Interview with Abt Associate representative, Sénégal, 29/11/2017. 
18 Interview with project management team member, Benin, 31/03/2017. 
19 Interview with project management team member, Benin, 15/03/2018. 
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for us, this is simple, we wished for […] an institution managed by private board of 
directors.20  
Their wish has been fulfilled with the ARCH project, as it is planned to delegate the 
management of the new agency to the private sector, most probably an insurer. However, some 
agreements still have to be reached on important matters, such as management costs and the 
legal framework. 
There is a huge gap between RAMU and ARCH. […] As they involved the private sector, 
we expressed our will to manage. However, we still don’t have an agreement on several 
points21  
The option has been agreed with the insurers, but I must admit that we have not 
discussed the commission yet.22 
The relation between states and international organizations can also be analysed through the 
concept of interests, although vertical interdependencies have their own “rules of the game” 
that cannot be ignored. Similarly, the role played by multilateral organizations in the 
emergence, conceptualization and diffusion of the idea of UHC is obviously important. 
However, the momentum around UHC has provided national state with the opportunity to 
benefit from important international financing, as many partners are willing to support this 
objective. Moreover, as Béland noticed, “health care systems […] are known as a competitive 
‘market-place for ideas’” (2010a : 622) and this is particularly true regarding UHC reforms, 
where multiple influences can be found. This has already been illustrated by the example of the 
conflict between the DECAM and UDAM projects in Senegal, which were supported by Abt 
Associates and the Belgian Development Agency. Some partners are also promoting and 
supporting the same kinds of strategies in both countries, such as the World Bank that supports 
the targeting processes of the poorest. If the national party often complains about the lack of 
synergy, alignment and harmonization between international partners, in both country, some of 
these partners felt like the state took advantage and, in some case, even caused this, as a strategy 
to draw as many funds as possible. 
Finally, the concept of interests allows us to question the perception and interests of the citizens 
about these reforms. While the interests of the public servants and formal workers are 
powerfully protected by unions, as it has been mentioned before, the main beneficiaries – as 
these reforms primarily aim to expand coverage to the informal and rural sectors - are poorly 
represented in the formulation processes. Indeed, most stakeholders involved in the negotiations 
benefit from other health insurance schemes. They assume that those concerned by the 
strategies they develop will be interested in it. As highlighted by Warin, “non-desire is 
unthought-of. This is due to the representation of protecting state: protecting, notably because 
he knows better than no one to define the social demand” (Warin, 2012 : 12). However, during 
casual talks with citizens in both countries, we regularly noticed a relative indifference to these 
policies, that are described as distant “political matters”. Some vulnerable households, entitled 
                                                          
20 Interview with insurance companies’ representative, Benin, 04/04/2014.  
21 Interview with insurance companies’ representative, Benin, 16/03/2018. 
22 Interview with project management team member, Benin, 15/03/2018. 
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for free health care, decided not to have recourse to it. In Senegal, several people also stated 
that they were not interested in CBHI membership due to the fact that they mostly have recourse 
to private or uncontracted providers. This demonstrates the advantages of taking into 
consideration the beneficiaries’ opinion, including their possible disinterest and the reasons 
underpinning “non-demand” (Warin, 2016), so as to developed relevant policies.  
Conclusion 
 
This contribution intended to analyse the national translation of the broad and ambitious 
objective of UHC, based on the policy formulation processes of two West-African countries, 
Benin and Senegal. Despite quite similar health histories and challenges, these countries have 
chosen different paths on the road to UHC, but they also have common features. Through the 
concepts of institutions, interests and ideas, we tried to explain these differences and 
similarities.  
Our analysis points out the relevance of a complementary use of these concepts, as they shed 
light on different facets of UHC reforms. The contribution successively considered each of the 
‘3Is’ and the possible explanations that they provide about the formulation process of UHC 
reforms. However, we also intended to show how these concepts combine and supplement each 
other, using an inductive method that does not presuppose of the primacy of one of them, but 
tries to develop complex and multi-causal explanations, as suggested by Palier and Surel 
(2005). 
As any social protection reform, UHC strategies are highly technical and political matters, and 
they involve multiple stakeholders with competing interests and ideas. They are also developed 
in a context that matters, as the rules of the game and strategies previously adopted shape the 
perception of what is possible and advisable to do. Our study of UHC reforms in Benin and 
Senegal finally corroborates that these reforms are the product of “aggregation logics”, 
“progressively elaborated during repeated interactions” and that the adopted reforms are “those 
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Over the last few years, Universal health coverage (UHC) has become a central objective of the 
international agenda for social protection and health, but no consensus has emerged on how to 
achieve it. This situation provides national governments with room of manoeuvre to design 
their national policies. However, much factors influence the formulation process and adoption 
of these strategies, such as institutions, interests, ideas and networks. On the one hand, Senegal 
has opted for a voluntary decentralized coverage that rests upon community-based insurance 
schemes as well as user fees exemptions intended for socio-demographic categories of 
population. On the other hand, the Beninese successive authorities opted for compulsory health 
coverage, based on centralized scheme(s), with the RAMU adopted during Y. Boni’s 
Presidency soon to be replaced by the ARCH project designed under P. Talon’s government. 
However, some features are also common in both countries, such as fully subsidized 
contribution targeted at the poorest households. Based on literature review and key 
stakeholders’ interviews, this contribution aims to provide a comparative analysis of the 
formulation process and design of UHC policies in Benin and Senegal, by looking at the 
influence of institutions, interests, ideas and actors’ networks, as suggested by Shearer, 
Abelson, Kouyaté et al. (2016). Although path dependency and decision taking processes are 
determining aspects of the strategies’ adoption, the role of interests and ideas, as well as the 
groups and epistemic communities defending them, have to be taken into account to understand 
why some option have been chosen above others. Vertical interdependencies are also decisive, 
as international organizations are key actors of the process, providing technical and financial 
assistance to these countries. However, the variety of available and sometimes competing 
international partners gives national authorities some opportunities to negotiate projects and 
support. All these factors converge to explain why different paths are followed to pursue the 
same objective of UHC. 
 
